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REGULATING MARKETS AND SOCIAL EUROPE: NEW 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU 
 
Imelda Maher* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Governance understood as the diffusion and fragmentation of 
governmental arrangements is exemplified by the multi-level governance 
structures of the EU itself.  Since its foundation, its supra-national 
character led to policy formation and implementation at different levels of 
government.  More recently, and partly as a result of recognition of the 
extent to which the EU is more dependent on regulation as an instrument 
of governance than traditional state polities,1 there has been a 
reconceptualisation of both the methods and instruments of governing at 
the European level.  Initially, innovation was triggered by the Single 
European Act which both introduced framework directives where detailed 
regulatory specifications were no longer set out at the European level but 
were in many instances delegated to private standard setting bodies2 and 
which started the ongoing (and often politically contentious) liberalisation 
programme.3  The liberalisation of energy and communications industries 
that previously were state monopolies combined competition and 
regulation with the emergence of enforcement agencies in turn spurring 
the creation of a patchwork of agency networks across Europe.4  
                                                 
* UCD Law School. 
1 G. Majone, 'Market Integration and Regulation: Europe after 1992' (1992) 43 
Metroeconomica 131 
2 H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards ain the 
Regulation of Integrating Markets Oxford, Hart (2005). 
3 C. Scott, 'Changing Patterns of European Community Utilities Law and Policy: An 
Institutional Hypothesis' in J. Shaw and G. More (eds.) New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union Oxford University Press, Oxford (1996). 
4 D. Coen and M. Thatcher, ‘Network Governance and Delegation: European Networks 
of Regulatory Agencies’ (2007) Regulation and Governance. 
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Under the Lisbon process5 newer forms of governance have emerged.  
Like the Single Market Programme these were linked to a deadline and an 
objective but unlike that programme, the governance methods, captured 
under the umbrella term ‘the open method of coordination’ were primarily 
based on policy learning, reporting and the issuance of guidelines all 
firmly within the realm of soft law6 which may or may not result in 
binding legal measures.7 This departs from the classic Monnet method 
where the Commission proposes legislation which is adopted by the 
Council (and now under co-decision with the European Parliament), 
although the privatisation of standard-setting under the Single Act marked 
an earlier departure from this classic approach.   Both Lisbon and the 
Single Market are underpinned by competition and competitiveness, with 
a competitiveness Council of Ministers being set up post-Lisbon.  
Competitiveness implies a more dirigiste industrial policy and is 
sometimes seen as undermining competition although in the EU 
competition policy with a strong economics-based rationale is seen as 
dominating policy formation leading to tensions on at least two planes.  
First, politically the French ‘no’ in part is seen as due to opposition to the 
perceived liberal market agenda of the EU.  This in part may explain the 
French insistence on the removal of a reference to free competition in 
Article 4 of the EC Treaty.  Second, the potential tension between 
competition and competitiveness reflects the search for a balance between 
                                                 
5 The core objective as articulated by the European Council in Lisbon in 2000 was to 
make Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustaining economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion with a deadline of 2010.  This has now been reduced to growth and jobs and the 
deadline has been dropped see generally, EC Commission, Delivering on Growth and 
Jobs: A New and Integrated Economic and Employment Co-ordination Cycle in the EU, 
SEC(2005) 193, Brussels, 3.2.2005. 
6 Where soft law is seen as measures which are non-binding but are capable (and may 
even be intended to have) binding effects see F. Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European 
Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques, in Daintith, Terence, 
(ed.) Implementing EC Law in the United Kingdom: Structures for Indirect Rule (1995, 
Chichester: Wiley) at 64. 
7 D. Hodson, and I. Maher, ‘The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case 
of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination’ (2001) 39(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 
719 
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structural reform – which goes to the heart of the Lisbon agenda – and 
what can loosely be described as ‘social Europe’.   
 
The authors in this series of papers address these two phenomena of the 
relationship between ‘new’ and ‘old’ governance and the tensions between 
the ‘market’ defined in terms of  strong competition policy and social 
Europe.  The first paper by Scott provides an overview of the nature of 
new governance and addresses the vexed – and the long-standing - issue of 
legitimacy.  This is followed by two substantive papers.  Clarke examines 
the Takeover Directive and the extent to which its flexibility has impeded 
its original objective of improving European international 
competitiveness. Barrett then looks at ‘Social Europe’ examining two 
different governance methods and their limitations.  The last two papers 
build on these two substantive fields with Deakin examining whether or 
not there is asymmetric governance between market regulation and social 
Europe (in this instance European company law and labour law) while 
Zumbansen through an exploration of European and German company law 
offers further insights into the issue of diversity in corporate governance in 
Europe and its re-assertion following problems in securing harmonisation 
and in the process explores the nature of the firm looking, like Deakin at 
both corporate governance and labour law.   
 
Colin Scott sets the scene for the papers that follow by contrasting more 
traditional conceptions of EU governance with an analysis of the variety 
of forms of ‘new governance’ arguing that some of the more innovative 
modes of governance are not in fact so new while some of the more recent 
modes of governance while new are not that innovative.   The question he 
addresses is whether this limited conception of new governance is 
inevitable given the legitimacy constraints within which the EU operates 
or whether there is potential for developing a broader conception of 
governance which through wider participation and involvement of non-
governmental governing capacities might bolster legitimacy through both 
better processes and better outcomes.  The diffusion of governing 
capacity, a hallmark of governance, has important implications for what 
type of instrument is possible as binding legal instruments are usually only 
available to central government.   At the same time, non-governmental 
actors can do things that are not possible – or legitimate - for 
governmental actors.  Thus the fragmentation of governance calls into 
question the focus on legitimation through democratic mechanisms, where 
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legitimacy is conceived of as decision which command support and are 
followed by those affected by them whether or not they agree with them. 
Because of the chronic democratic deficit in the EU, legitimacy has been 
predicated on outputs to a much grater degree than within states.  Thus he 
argues that evaluation of legitimacy of emerging governance methods 
might examine the extent to which non-governmental actors and processes 
are engaged with markets and communities (alternative forms of 
accountability well-rehearsed in the regulation literature), seen as offering 
alternative legitimation mechanisms.  The shift from law-based to 
network-based governance is not that innovative as opportunities to better 
engage with non-governmental capacities have been neglected or 
restricted in part by concerns for democratic legitimacy.  
 
Blanaid Clarke examines the goals and achievements of the Takeover 
Directive which arose out of concerns for European competitiveness with 
an integrated European capital market seen as an important dimension of 
improving international competitiveness.  The paper paints a bleak picture 
of failure to realise those objectives and how diversity remains. There is 
some light at the end of the proverbial tunnel with the issue of diverse 
national regimes analysed further by both Deakin and Zumbansen.   
Clarke notes that the directive in fact does not increase international 
competitiveness – largely due to the protectionist attitude of a large 
number of Member States in their implementation of it.  It does provide a 
minimum standard but for those states that already had those standards 
there is no benefit and even the possibility of greater uncertainty.  While 
arguably the directive provides a useful structure for new Member States, 
this is not essential as there are examples of states who introduced national 
takeover regimes before the Directive.  The long history of the Directive 
also highlights the potential for policy learning – usually associated with 
soft law regimes - at the national level even where there is a failure to 
adopt legislation at the EU level with German law incorporating a 
mandatory bid rule despite having resisted such a measure in earlier EC 
proposals.  She also notes the difficulties of moving from a voluntary (and 
effective) system in the UK to one requiring statutory foundation 
potentially reducing flexibility and, by implication, effectiveness and this 
despite the emphasis on flexibility within the Directive itself. By opting 
for a basic principles model the Directive ensures that takeover regulation 
will vary at national level. This retains the scope for regulatory innovation 
and, given that variation generates regulatory competition, may lead to 
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specialisation in different national regimes rather than convergence across 
regimes.  At the same time, use is made of soft law instruments: notably 
the Recommendation on the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory 
Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the 
(Supervisory) Boards.  While Clarke concedes that soft law is appropriate 
where one size cannot fit all, there is a problem with some aspects of 
corporate governance falling between regulatory stools thereby 
undermining legitimacy as the EC creates expectations (e.g. of a level 
playing field and common set of rules for takeovers) which it cannot meet.   
 
Gavin Barrett explores how elusive consensus has proved for EU social 
policy and the impact this has had on the governance methods chosen: 
focussing on the European social dialogue and legislation with 
effectiveness and input legitimacy (in particular in relation to the range of 
voices heard) central concerns in his analysis.   Social dialogue is a 
Treaty-based policy making process whereby management and employee 
representatives cooperate in policy and law making.  The process has had 
some successes in leading to legislation and some failures leading to the 
perception that the Open Method was needed to achieve EC goals.  Barrett 
identifies the process as flexible: leading to an extraordinary range of 
outcomes; evolving, with a major role of the Commission and a weak role 
for the Parliament.  The challenges for the partnership: lack of 
transparency, lack of openness to other non-governmental actors once 
agreement is reached and the challenges of enlargement are also outlined.   
Looking at a specific piece of legislation – the Acquired Rights Directive 
– Barrett notes the long history of its adoption exacerbated by the need for 
unanimity.  This in turn led to omissions designed to ensure sufficient 
consensus for adoption which propels the European Court in its 
interpretative role, into the role of quasi-lawmaker.  The discussion points 
to the potential for ambiguity and lack of precision in the text – criticism 
normally raised (as seen in Clarke’s paper) in relation to soft law 
instruments.  The difference between the two forms of law being that the 
Court remains as final arbiter where the ambiguity lies in legislation.  
Barrett’s paper explores the implementation of the Directive in the Irish 
context noting the importance that flows from the chosen method of 
implementation, the potential that implementation has to disrupt a national 
law and the extent to which the industrial relations context has on the 
impact of the directive.  The impact of the directive is also affected by the 
adequacy or otherwise of remedies and sanctions – the absence of sanction 
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being a common complaint in relation to soft law measures.  
Implementation is also achieved through a parallel social dialogue 
operating on a consensus basis meaning only one optional measure has 
been adopted.    
 
Deakin explores recent experience in European company law which, as 
Clarke’s paper has shown, bucks the trend towards new governance 
techniques.  He then draws on this analysis to frame a wider discussion of 
the prospects for the European social model in the context of market 
liberalisation.  He asks whether there will be an asymmetric approach with 
the flexible new governance techniques dominant in social and 
employment policy with hard law imposing a single model (or at least 
minimum standards) in the field of company law and the internal market?  
The nuanced answer to this question is salutary for advocates of the open 
method as a form of flexible governance. Like Scott, he sees new 
governance as in fact having important continuities with earlier 
governance practices with reflexive harmonisation a precursor which 
accommodated diversity of practice among member states.  Company law 
has acquiring its own (modified) form of the open method with the 
establishment of a high level group of experts to facilitate national 
convergence, policy learning and to advise the Commission.  There is no 
benchmarking as yet but there is now an institutional framework within 
which to initiate it.  Deakin – consistent with Clarke’s analysis - concludes 
that the prospect of standardisation of company law has receded following 
the experience of the Takeovers Directive and the fragmentation of 
national laws that resulted from it.  At the same time, there is scope for a 
reflexive form of governance to allow for policy learning.  At the same 
time, what he sees as a fixation with one mode of best practice based on 
the US model reduces scope for reflexive governance and diversity.  In 
labour law, there is greater scope for flexibility. In both fields, the role of 
the European Court and its capacity to change the regulatory environment 
through broadly liberalising judgments is highlighted.  Like Scott, the 
open method is viewed as a progression and not a completely new method 
of governance.  The challenge is not new or old governance but what level 
of formality is necessary given the tension between state autonomy and 
the goal of European integration with the deliberative models at the heart 
of new governance while playing lip service to national diversity having 
the capacity to tend toward the imposition of single models.  Reflexive 
harmonisation may in this situation provide a better model.  
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Peer Zumbansen’s paper takes as his focus the firm and challenges the 
questionable divide between management and labour that lies at the heart 
of e.g. .the social partnership in EU law-making.  As with Scott and 
Deakin, the paper attempts to bridge a conventional space this time 
between corporate and labour law literatures by building on the theory of 
the innovative enterprise.  Through that theory and its insights Zumbansen 
argues that corporate governance regimes are embedded in differently 
shaped regulatory frameworks, that in turn are characterised by distinct 
institutions (formal and informal) and enforcement processes.  His paper 
also points to diversity and challenges the view that there is convergence 
of corporate governance.    He discusses what is meant by corporate 
governance before examining corporate governance in Germany and the 
EU and the changing regulatory landscape in both locales.  He also notes 
that the Commission is now differentiating its law making agenda given 
the political obstacles to convergence.  Like Clarke, Deakin and Barrett, 
he notes the importance of the European Court’s case law in prompting 
reform with that case-law creating regulatory competition in the field of 
corporate governance.  Mindful of the growth of soft law initiatives, he 
warns that any evaluation of European company law requires an analysis 
of these regimes as well as legislation.  He provides a forward looking 
agenda to complete the series by drawing on the Varieties of Capitalism 
literature and complimenting it with a regulatory theory approach and a 
shift away from conventional bi-polar conceptions of the firm as either a 
nexus-of-contracts or a social institution towards one that takes into 
account the particular features of its decision-making processes which are 
shaped by high-risk assessment of uncertain development trajectories.  
 
Thus the papers end with an agenda for further research in the field of 
corporate governance with all of them highlighting the absence of a clear 
dichotomy between hard and soft law with characteristics normally 
associated with soft law - inextricably bound up with new governance 
methods – of uncertainty, ambiguity and principles rather than fixed 
norms also found within classic Community legislation such as the 
Takeover Directive. Through discussion of implementation as well as the 
wider theoretical dimensions, the papers also remind us of the challenge of 
multi-level governance in the European context and the need for ongoing 
evidence-based research in evaluating the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
governance regimes. 
